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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND NON-MARKET 
ECONOMIES: THE CASE OF THE PEOPLES 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of whether U.S. countervailing duty (CVD) laws 1 are 
to be applied in investigations of imports from non-market economy 
(NME) countries2 was the subject of a November 6, 1983 hearing 
before the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC).3 Prompted by the 
filing of a countervailing duty petition4 against the Peoples Republic 
of China (PRC), these "novel issue" hearings represented the first 
time that the DOC has been called upon to evaluate the counter-
vailability of alleged producer subsides in an NME country.5 The 
subsidy alleged in the petition was the PRC's dual exchange rate 
system6 whereby one particular yen conversion rate is offered to 
1. U.S. countervailing duty laws are those which levy an import duty on goods from 
countries where producer costs are subsidized by the government. The purpose is to restore 
free comparative advantage by offsetting the amount of the foreign producer subsidy. U.S. 
countervailing duty laws are found at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1980 & Supp. VI 1983). 
2. Non-market economy countries are those where the resources for and the means 
of production are allocated and put to use through central government planning. Usually 
the government claims ownership of most or all such means of production and bases deci-
sions as to what will be produced on pre-determined goals. There is no price mechanism 
where supply and demand interact to allocate resources or incentive or disincentive various 
production decisions. Typically, non-market economy countries are those in the communist 
or eastern block. 
3. The hearings were held in Washington, D.C. over the period November 3-4, 1983. 
Department of Commerce Docket No. C570-005. 
4. The countervailing duty petition against the PRC was filed with the Department 
of Commerce pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1980) on behalf of the American Textile Manufac-
turers Institute (ATMI), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), 
and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). The imported merchan-
dise in question were textiles, apparel and related _products from the PRC. See Countervailing 
Duty Petition of the ATMI, the ACTWU and the ILGWU, Sept. 12, 1983, Department of 
Commerce Docket No. C570-005 [hereinafter Countervailing Duty Petition]. 
5. Prior to the institution of this petition, all countervailing duty investigations had 
been related to imports from market economy countries, such as Western European nations. 
6. The significance of this practice as a means of subsidizing producer behavior, while 
admittedly ambiguous in centrally planned economies, is not totally without merit. While 
it is arguable that without a market mechanism which determines a norm against which 
subsidies can be granted, there is no subsidy; the dual rate serves as a means of redistributing 
profits on import transactions to offset the losses on export transactions. Whether or not 
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producers of certain non-export goods7 and another more generous 
rate is offered to producers of goods keyed for export.8 The keyed 
goods in this case were textiles, apparel and related products.9 
The issues presented at the hearing, which was also a part of 
the DOC's preliminary finding investigation,10 were framed to reflect 
both the novelty of a non-market application of U.S. CVD law, and 
the specifics of the PRC case giving rise to that novelty. The first 
was whether under U.S. CVD law,11 bounties or grants may be found 
in NME countries, and second, whether dual exchange rates can 
confer a subsidy where the entire trade sector is subject to a single 
rate and the currency is not convertible.12 
This article offers a summary of the arguments that were 
presented to the DOC on the issues recited above. Arguing for the 
petitioners were the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, the 
this is the type of transaction that Congress intended to be countervailable under § 1303, 
is the subject of the rest of this discussion. 
7. This rate is called the "official rate" and applies to certain limited non-trade trans-
actions, such as tourism, remittances, certain invisibles unrelated to trade and transactions 
with such organizations as the IMF. The official rate, pegged to a basket of other foreign 
currencies stood at 1.9939 yen to the dollar on May 31, 1983. See Preconference brief of 
Walter S. Surrey, Counsel for the National Council for U.S.-China Trade at 15. DOC DKT 
No. C570-005. 
8. This rate is called the "internal settlement rate" and applies to all foreign trade 
transactions, including invisibles related to trade. This higher rate of 2.8 yen to the dollar 
was introduced to stimulate PRC exports on January l, 1981. See Countervailing Duty Peti-
tion, supra note 4, at 3. 
9. U.S. Department of Commerce, Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty In-
vestigation, Oct. 15, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005. 
10. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b), within 85 days after a countervailing duty peti-
tion is filed, the Department must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe 
or suspect that a subsidy is being provided with respect to the merchandise which is the 
subject of the investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b) (1980). 
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1980). The text of § 1303(a)(l) is as follows: 
Except in the case of an article or merchandise which is the product of a country 
under the Agreement (within the meaning of section 1671(b) of this title), whenever 
any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of govern-
ment, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow, 
directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacturer or production 
or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such coun-
try, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, then 
upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the country, whether the 
same shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and 
whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when 
exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by 
remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid. in all such cases, in 
addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such 
bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. 
12. Department of Commerce, Notice of Conference on Novel Issues, Oct. 5, 1983, DOC 
DKT No. C570-005. 
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Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, and the Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers Union.13 Arguing for the opposi-
tion were a mixed group of twenty importers comprised of major 
U.S. clothing retailers and trade associations.14 A brief analysis of 
the implications of this debate is offered by way of a conclusion. 
Before moving to the arguments themselves, it is important 
to note that certain events have taken place since the DOC hear-
ing which have placed the resolution of these issues on hold. These 
events, however, are current evidence of the dangerous political 
leverage, to be discussed below, inherent in granting domestic pro-
ducers this novel cause of action against NME producers. 
On December 6, 1983, in the wake of strong PRC protests and 
warnings, Commerce Secretary Baldrige asked the producers' 
association to withdraw the CVD petition in favor of a Presiden-
tial initiative to resolve the textile producers' concerns.14aThe peti-
tioners agreed, and on December 16, 1983, President Reagan an-
nounced new, more lenient criteria for triggering the "call" 
mechanism whereby imports from communist countries are 
restricted under the Trade Act of 1974.14h As a condition for 
withdrawal, the petitioners were granted and still hold the right 
to reintroduce the petition, without prejudice, if the President's in-
itiative proves unsatisfactory.14c Thus, while the arguments below 
are presented as an on-going controversy, they are yet even more 
significant because of the implications arising from their 
non-resolution. 
II. CAN BOUNTIES OR GRANTS BE FOUND IN 
NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES? 
The phrasing of the question presented above is that which 
appeared in the DOC notice announcing the "novel issue" hearing 
13. See Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, supra note 9, at 2. 
14. See Countervailing Duty Petition, supra note 4, at 14. 
14a. On December 6, 1983, Secretary Baldrige convinced the Textile producers to 
withdraw the CVD petition and promised to reinstate the investigation if later requested 
to by the industry. He further promised that the Department would make an expedited 
finding within two working days if the petition were reinstated. 9 U.S. Import Weekly [BNA] 
No. 10, at 373 (Dec. 7, 1983). 
14b. This "call" procedure is part of the regulations implementing section 406 of the 
Trade Act of 197 4. Section 406 allows the President to invoke import relief whenever "market 
disruption" exists with respect to products imported from Communist countries. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2436 (1980). Market disruption occurs "whenever imports of an article, like or directly 
competitive with an article produced by such domestic industry are increased rapidly, either 
absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury or threat thereof, 
to such domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1980). 
14c. Supra, note 14a. 
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under discussion in this article.15 Petitioners, in their preconference 
submission however, offered a different version of the question: do 
U.S. countervailing duty laws apply to state-controlled economies?16 
While there is no doubt great similarity between these two 
questions, 17 the arguments presented by the domestic producers and 
the clothing importers are indeed somewhat incongruous. For peti-
tioners, the threshold question is a pure "plain language" question 
of statutory construction: do the laws apply?18 Whereas for the im-
porters, the statutory applicability issue is fundamentally depen-
dent upon the economic reality, to which the statute refers, being 
found in NME countries.19 
A. ARGUMENTS BY THE PETITIONERS20 
1. The Plain Language of the CVD Statute Requires its Applica-
tion to Imports from NME Countries. 
Interpretation of a statute always begins with the language 
of the statute itself.21 Moreover, unless otherwise defined, words 
in a statute should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning.22 
Looking at the CVD statute, petitioners' attention is focused on the 
words which state that CVD law applies to "any country, 
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of 
government."23 These words, petitioners conclude, are clear and 
unambiguous. The CVD law applies to all countries and makes no 
exceptions based on economic preconditions or form of government.24 
15. Department of Commerce, Notice of Conference on Novel Issues, supra note 12. 
16. Submission on Behalf of the ATM!, the ACTWU, the ILG WU and the AAMA, Oct. 
28, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005. 
17. The connection being isolated comes from the language of the CVD statute, 19 
U.S.C. § 1303(a)(l) (1980), which reads in pertinent part: "whenever any country ... shall 
pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon .... " 
18. See Submission on Behalf of the ACTWU, the ILGWU and the AAMA, Oct. 28, 
1983, at 1-10. DOC DKT No. C570-005. 
19. See Post-conference Brief on Behalf of Kmart Corporation, Nov. 14, 1983 at 2-5, 
DOC DKT No. C570-005. 
20. See Submission on Behalf of ACTWU, the ILGWU and the AAMA, Oct. 28, 1983, 
at 1-10, DOC DKT No. C570-005 [hereinafter Submission by Petitioners]. 
21. Petitioners cite here G.R. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 986, 
990 (1983); Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 4, n.2. 
22. Diamond v. Chakrabarby, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); Perin v. United States, 444 U.S. 
37, 42 (1979). Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 4, n.4. 
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(l) (1980). 
24. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 5. 
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2. The Legislative History of the CVD Law is Consistent with 
its Plain Language. 
Citing their own extensive review of the legislative history of 
U.S. CVD law, petitioners state that equal application of the law 
to both market and non-market economy countries is fully consis-
tent with the statute's intended purpose.25 The CVD law specifically 
acts to prevent domestic producers from being placed in "jeopardy" 
by the "unfair competitive advantages" that foreign governments, 
either market or NME countries, can provide for exporters through 
subsidies.26 Such subsidies, petitioners point out, are no less 
threatening to fair competition because they are levied in non-
market rather than in market economy countries.27 
3. International Agreements to which the United States is a 
Party Reflect an Equal Application of CVD Law to Market and 
Non-Market Economy Countries. 28 
a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 29 
While the PRC is not a party to GATT,30 petitioners argue that 
under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle,31 U.S. trade laws 
must not grant state-controlled economy countries exemptions not 
granted to free market countries. To do so, they argue, would be 
25. The purpose of the CVD law is to redress unfair trade practices that "distort world 
trade and discriminate against United States sales." S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
183 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 7186, 7328; Submission by Peti-
tioners, supra note 20, at 7, n.10. 
26. H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1979); Submission by Petitioners, 
supra note 20, at 8, n.11. In this regard, however, petitioners make very limited arguments 
to explain or refute strong challenges that NME countries cannot confer subsidies. 
27. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 8. 
28. While none of the agreements referred to below require U.S. domestic trade laws 
to apply equally to all countries without condition, they are offered in support of petitioners' 
positions based on an argument of promoting consistency in international practice. 
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700. 
30. There are six socialist countries which have joined the GATT: Yugoslavia, Cuba, 
Poland, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The PRC, the Soviet Union, East Germany 
and Bulgaria are not members. 
31. The most-favored-nation principle is a central feature of GATT. It assures each 
contracting party that any "advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" respecting "customs 
duties and charges of any kind" that is granted by one of their number to any trading part-
ner "shall be immediately and unconditionally" extended to all other contracting parties. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 29, Part I, art. 1, para. 1, at A12. 
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to violate both the letter and the spirit of the GATT.32 Such a policy 
would not only severely disadvantage our major trading partners,33 
but would create an incentive for all NME countries to vigorously 
subsidize all exports in order to enhance foreign exchange 
earnings.34 
b. GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 
Petitioners look to paragraph 1 of article 15 of the GATT 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidy 
Code) as further support for applying U.S. CVD law to imports from 
NME countries.35 Under this agreement, there are express provi-
sions which impose countervailing duties against imports from NME 
countries.36 Consistency in international practice, therefore, requires 
the United States to do the same. 
B. ARGUMENTS BY THE IMPORTERS 
1. The Plain Language of the CVD Statute Applies to an 
Economic Reality Nonexistent in NME Countries. 
Contrary to petitioners' emphasis on the words "any country" 
found in the CVD statute, the importers stress the dependency of 
that phrase with the next phrase of the statutory scheme: "[that] 
shall pay or bestow ... [a] bounty or grant."37 Such "grants," the 
importers claim, are not found in NME countries.38 The importers 
argue that the CVD law, in concept, is based upon a world in which 
free market forces are the norm and is designed to offset aberra-
tions from that norm.39 In NME countries, however, where market 
forces do not determine the allocation of resources for manufac-
turers, producers or exporters, there is no norm, "as we know it," 
against which aberrations can be measured.4° Such grants, which 
32. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 12. 
33. On this point see especially the scenario of Pakistan and the PRC presented in 
Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 15-17. 
34. Id. at 12-13. 
35. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done April 12, 1979, (1979) 31U.S.T.513, T.I.A.S. 
No. 9619. 
36. Id. at Part IV, art. 15, para. l, at 538. 
37. This concept of dependency is found in the Post-Conference Brief on Behalf of Kmart 
Corporation, Nov. 3, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 2 (hereinafter Kmart Brief). 
38. Id. at 3. 
39. Id. at 4. 
40. Id. at 3. 
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are by definition ones bestowed in contrast to market allocations, 
are nonexistent where there is no market which allocates.'1 
2. There is No Legislative Purpose or History Which Requires 
the Application of U.S. CVD Laws to NME Countries. 
The importers stress that while there is no specific mention 
of NME countries in the CVD law, there is explicit methodology 
for dealing with NME countries set forth in the antidumping 
legislation42 and section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.43 Moreover, 
while congressional concerns are evident regarding lower priced 
NME exports flooding U.S. markets, those concerns are 
appropriately addressed only through antidumping and section 406 
procedures.44 Evidence of this is the clear dissatisfaction with then 
current trade laws, including the CVD statute, which was expressed 
by Congress when NME antidumping and section 406 procedures 
were implemented.45 Whereas no parallel NME procedures were 
added to the CVD law, the importers conclude that U.S. CVD law 
is simply "inappropriate" for use against imports from NME coun-
tries and was not considered "salvagable" by Congress to ever be 
so.46 
3. International Agreements to Which the United States is a 
Party Do Not Require Blanket Application of U.S. CVD Laws to 
NME Countries. 
a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4 1 
According to the importers, it is well established practice under 
GATT that contracting parties possess the discretion to treat NME 
countries differently from market economy countries.48 The GATT 
itself, in its Notes and Supplemental Provisions, provides for NME 
uniqueness through special treatment of imports from such 
41. Id. at 4. 
42. 19 u.s.c. § 1673 (1980). 
43. 19 u.s.c. § 2436 (1980). 
44. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 6-7. 
45. S.Rep. No. 93-1298 at 210; H.Rep. No. 93-571 at 82; Kmart Brief, supra note 38, 
at 7, n.6. 
46. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 7. 
47. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 29. 
48. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 12. 
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countries.49 U.S. law, the importers stress, takes a similar approach. 
In section 406 of the Trade Act of 197 4, there are special provi-
sions which cover only imports from NME countries-even those 
entitled to MFN treatment.50 Under petitioners' approach, if sec-
tion 406 establishes a different method for achieving relief for non-
market as opposed to market economy countries, U.S. law must 
already violate the MFN principle. This, the importers stress, is 
not the case because of the clearly recognized discretion for deal-
ing with NME countries under GATT. Thus, a similarly excepting 
U.S. CVD law does not and can not violate U.S. MFN obligations. 
b. GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 
The importers argue here that because article 15 of the Sub-
sidy Code clearly contemplates NME trade sanctions only where 
domestic injury is alleged,51 and U.S. CVD law does not,52 there is 
no analogy found in the Subsidy Code for applying U.S. CVD law 
to NME countries.53 Moreover, because the injury test required by 
the Subsidy Code represents a higher standard of proof for achiev-
ing import relief54 than that found in the U.S. CVD law in NME 
cases,55 an application of U.S. CVD law to NME countries would 
be both arbitrary and inequitable.56 
49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 29, Annex I, art. VI, para. 
1, point 2, at A86. 
50. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 12. 
51. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, 
supra note 35, Part IV, art. 15, para. 1, at 538. 
52. Under current CVD law, a material injury test applies to investigations of dutiable 
products only from countries which have signed the International Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures or assume similar obligations. See Interpretation and Applica-
tion of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra 
note 35. Investigations concerning dutiable products from other countries continue to be 
conducted pursuant to § 1303 without the necessity of showing injury. No NME countries 
are currently party to the Subsidies Code and therefore would require no finding of injury 
if U.S. CVD law were to be applied to them. See Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 8-9. 
53. Conclusion drawn from Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 8-9. 
54. An injury test, paralleled in U.S. trade law, requires the finding that a U.S. in-
dustry is materially injured or there is threat thereof, before a CVD can be imposed. 19 
U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1980). As defined by § 1677(7), a material injury is harm which is not in-
consequential, immaterial or unimportant. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1980). Thus, an imposition 
without such a finding would indeed be easier to implement. 
55. See supra note 52. 
56. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 8-9. 
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III. DOES A DUAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CONFER A 
SUBSIDY WHERE THE ENTIRE TRADE SECTOR IS 
SUBJECT TO A SINGLE RATE AND THE CURRENCY 
IS NOT CONVERTIBLE? 
A. ARGUMENTS BY THE PETITIONERS 
1. Legal Precedent Requires an Affirmative Finding that a Dual 
Exchange Rate System Does Confer a Subsidy. 
Petitioners rely primarily on the 1940 case of F. W. Woolworth 
Co. v. United States57 in which a Treasury Department finding58 of 
a countervailable subsidy based on Germany's nonconvertible dual 
rate was upheld by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. While 
the facts of the case are complex and the working of the subsidy 
is readily distinguishable from the PRC system,59 petitioners stress, 
as did the court, that it is the effect of the practice on producer 
returns which is dispositive.60 Like the Woolworth case, the dual 
exchange rate in the PRC, "through various devices and through 
different authorized government agencies [sought] to aid its 
manufacturers in invading foreign markets."61 Moreover, in both 
instances, the currency was non-convertible and the dual rate was 
applied to all sectors of export trade.62 Therefore, as in the Ger-
man case, petitioners conclude the Chinese system must represent 
a subsidy because it also enables producers to sell below world 
market prices and still realize more local currency than they would 
recover if the transaction had occurred at the official rate.63 
2. Dual Exchange Rate Systems Possess All the Legal 
Characteristics Of a Countervailable Subsidy. 
Petitioners characterize a subsidy as a state practice which 
constitutes "preferential treatment" for a particular class of 
57. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A. 1940). 
58. T.D. 49,719, 74 Treas. Dec. 192 (1938); T.D. 48,360, 69 Treas. Dec. 1008 (1936). Prior 
to the time the DOC took over administration of U.S. CVD law, the Department of the 
Treasury held the responsibility. 
59. See Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 20-26. 
60. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 353; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 23-24. 
61. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 353. 
62. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 348; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 24. The 
Woolworth case is silent on the question of whether the German system could be used for 
import transactions. 
63. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 25. 
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persons.64 In determining whether a particular practice qualifies as 
a subsidy, petitioners cite four criterion derived from the decisions 
of both U.S. courts and administrative agencies. They are: (1) the 
economic consequences of the program for producers and 
exporters;65 (2) the economic consequences of the program on 
exports;66 (3) the foreign government's intent in establishing the sub-
ject program;67 (4) whether the program acts as a substitute for 
another, directly and obviously countervailable subsidy.68 Petitioners 
assert that a dual exchange rate program, involving a nonconvert-
ible currency, and applicable to all sectors of trade, may have all 
the recognized characteristics of a countervailable subsidy.69 
Applying these criteria to the PRC system, petitioners argue, 
the dual yen rate confers an undeniable subsidy on producers.7° For 
exporters using the more favorable internal rate, the conversion rate 
is approximately 41 percent above the official rate.71 For all others 
who wish to convert, only the lower official rate is available.72 The 
effect on producers is clearly preferential. For exports, the effect 
of the dual rate is equally dramatic. In 1981, the year the dual rate 
was established, the PRC showed the first positive balance of trade 
since 1977.73 Moreover, for the year 1982, that positive balance had 
increased over 500 percent.74 Finally, not only is the dual rate called 
a "subsidy rate" by PRC officials,75 but it was expressly intended 
to simplify a number of other subsidies that were used to stimulate 
Chinese exports prior to 1981.76 Therefore, according to the stan-
dards set by U.S. courts and administrative agencies, the PRC dual 
rate qualifies as a countervailable subsidy. 
64. Downs v. United States, 113 F. 144, 147 (4th Cir. 1902), affd 187 U.S. 496 (1903); 
Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834,838 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); 
Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 28, n.38, 39. 
65. Industrial Fastners Group, American Importer v. United States, 710 F.2d 1576, 
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 28, n.40. 
66. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1977), affd 437 
U.S. 443 (1978); Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 28, n.41. 
67. Nicholas and Co. v. United States, 7 C.C.P.A. 97, 107 (1916), ajf'd, 249 U.S. 34, 219 
(1919). Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 27-29, n.37. 
68. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 353; Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 29, n.43. 
69. Submission by Petitioner, supra note 20, at 29. 
70. Id. at 30. 
71. Id. at 31. 
72. Id. 
73. See Countervailing Duty Petition, supra note 4, figure A, at 16. 
74. Id. 
75. Statement of Wei Yunning, Vice Chairman of the PRC's Foreign Investment Con-
trol Commission and the Import-Export Commission, cited in Countervailing Duty Petition, 
supra note 4, at 4. 
76. Submission by Petitioners, supra note 20, at 33. 
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3. A Dual Exchange Rate, Where One Rate Applies to the 
Entire Trade Sector, is Not Analagous to a Currency Devalua-
tion Nor is It Trade Neutral. 
A dual exchange rate system is not a devaluation and, in fact, 
is implemented to achieve wholly different objectives than a 
devaluation.77 A system of dual rates, petitioners point out, is used 
to isolate the domestic economy from the competitive effects of in-
ternational cost and price differentials.78 A devaluation, on the other 
hand, implies a recognition of international cost and price differen-
tials and is an attempt to equalize them and the associated balance 
of payments disequilibrium. 79 Moreover, petitioners stress, evidence 
shows that the PRC expressly refused devaluation because of the 
potential costs devaluation would have on receipts from tourism 
and remittances from overseas.80 Perpetuating a dual exchange rate, 
therefore, is clearly in contrast to a devaluation. 
On the issue of trade neutrality, a dual exchange rate is a classic 
example of trade distortion.81 Where a trade account exchange rate, 
such as the PRC internal rate, is lower than the rate previously 
in effect for exports and imports, such a rate acts to promote ex-
ports and discourage imports.82 Such rates are, by definition, export 
promotion devices.83 Not only are they not trade neutral, petitioners 
conclude, but they have precisely the same effect as a cash pay-
ment on exports, and a surcharge on imports.84 
B. ARGUMENTS BY THE IMPORTERS 
1. Legdl Precedent is Consistent with a Finding that the PRC 
Dual Rate System Does Not Confer a Subsidy. 
The PRC dual rate system applies a single unified rate to all 
transactions in China's export/import sector.85 By contrast, only 
when a system grants benefits to specified categories within that 
77. Id. at 37. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 37-38. 
81. Id. at 39. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 39-40. 
85. Post-Conference Statement of the Footwear Group of the American Association 
of Exporters and Importers, Nov. 11, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 1 [hereinafter State-
ment by Footwear Group]. 
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sector can it amount to a subsidy.86 This is the rule, the importers 
assert, under applicable United States precedent.87 The PRC single 
export rate, therefore, does not confer a subsidy. 
Just like the petitioners, the importers cite the 1940 Customs 
Court case of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States in support of 
the above proposition and their application of it.88 In Woolworth, 
the importers assert, the finding of a countervailable subsidy was 
predicated upon a dual rate system in which classes or types of 
exports were granted a preferential rate of exchange.89 For further 
support in applying CVD law only in cases of "preferential treat-
ment," the importers look to two administrative decisions, Pork 
RindfromMexico,90 and LambMeatfromNewZealand,91 where dual 
systems were applied to all exports and were not found to confer 
subsidies.92 U.S. legal precedent, therefore, is consistent with a 
finding that the PRC dual rate system does not confer a subsidy. 
2. No Evidence Exists to Support a Characterization of the PRC 
Dual Rate As a Subsidy. 
The importers generally agree with petitioners' characteriza-
tion of a subsidy, as stated above.93 They conclude, however, that 
no evidence exists upon which to base a finding that these criteria 
have been fulfilled. 94 
In terms of the effect on exporters, because the PRC dual rate 
applies a single rate to all trade transactions, the required preferen-
tial treatment is not present.95 Relying on the case of Carlisle Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. United States,953 the importers stress that the term 
"subsidy" under the CVD statute does not refer to generally 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Woolworth, 115 F.2d at 348. 
89. Id.; Statement by Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3. 
90. Pork Rind PeUets from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 39105, 39107 (1983), cited in Statement 
by Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3. 
91. Lamb Meat from New Zealand, 48 Fed. Reg. 58120 (1983), cited in Statement by 
Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3. 
92. Statement by Footwear Group, supra note 85, at 3. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69; Post-conference Brief presented by 
Counsel Siegel, Mandell & Davidson, P.C., Nov. 14, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 12. 
Reference here is to petitioners emphasis on the need for "preferential treatment" to be 
part of any characterization of a subsidy under U.S. CVD laws. 
94. Statement by Siegel, Mandell & Davidson, supra note 93, at 12. 
95. Id. at 12-13. 
95a. Carlisle, 564 F . Supp. at 834. 
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available benefits, such as a single rate applied to the entire trade 
sector.96 As for the effect on exports, the importers point out that 
while there has been an increase in PRC exports, there is no 
evidence which links this rise to the dual rate practice.97 Finally, 
the materials presented by petitioners consist of English transla-
tions of various Chinese documents which petitioners allege con-
tain the word "subsidy."98 As a basis for inferring intent, the im-
porters argue that these translations may well be totally out of con-
text to what an official Chinese translation would include.99 The 
Chinese Government, in its statement to the DOC, denies that any 
subsidy exists.100 As long as such conflict continues, the importers 
conclude, no determination of intent based on potentially biased 
translations can be conclusive.101 
3. Dual Exchange Rates for Non-Convertible Currencies, Applied 
to the Entire Trade Sector, Are No Different Than a Trade 
Neutral, General Devaluation. 
In non-convertible currency countries, those exporters who 
earn foreign exchange in open market transactions have only one 
source to redeem that currency for domestic trade: their own cen-
tral bank. It is this inability to openly convert, and therefore the 
access to only one rate at which to convert, which makes the PRC 
dual rate trade neutral.102 Where there is no access, as in the PRC, 
for exporters to "reconvert" their admittedly overvalued yen to 
dollars at the official market rate, the benefit accrued is an inter-
nal one that is not advantageous for future trade transactions.103 The 
result, therefore, is trade neutrality. 
Similarly, it is a uniform application of the single rate to the 
entire trade sector which also makes the PRC system no different 
96. Statement by Seigel, Mandell & Davidson, supra note 93, at 14. 
97. Id. 
98. Posthearing Brief on Behalf of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and the Association of General 
Merchandise Chains, Nov. 15, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 5 (hereinafter statement 
by Wal-Mart). 
99. Id. 
100. See Statement by Spokesman of Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
Nov. 3, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005. 
101. Statement by Wal-Mart, supra note 98, at 5-7. The argument stresses that in this 
case of conflicting statements, the "best-evidence" test requiring use of petitioners' evidence 
is highly questionable in light of the PRC Minister's Statement. 
102. Kmart Brief, supra note 37, at 14. 
103. Id. 
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than a general devaluation of the domestic currency .104 Devaluation, 
the importers stress, has never been considered countervailable.105 
While devaluations may convey some benefit to the PRC's balance 
of payments by making exports cheaper and imports more expen-
sive, the latter effect also increases production costs for countries, 
such as the PRC, which rely heavily on imports of capital equip-
ment and raw materials.106 Overall, in contrast to subsidies, devalua-
tions made for balance of payment reasons are inherently costly .101 
IV. ANALYSIS 
While the issues presented above are themselves both con-
troversial and challenging, they hold a broader significance in the 
overall development of Sino-American trade relations. In the PRC's 
trade relations with the West, the complicated range of political 
and ideological questions have always made progress contingent 
upon careful negotiation and narrowly drawn bilateral agreements.108 
The emergence of a countervailing duty investigation against the 
PRC has upset this deliberate course of action and threatens to set 
a precedent challenging the stability of future trade relations with 
the PRC.109 As a November 1983 statement by the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade warns, the United States 
should "keep in mind the broad spectrum of economic and trade 
relations" between the United States and the PRC, and thereby 
"handle the [CVD investigation] carefully and properly so that these 
relations will not be jeopardized."110 
To the Chinese, a CVD investigation represents more than just 
an isolated contest within the general realm of trade relations. From 
104. Id. at 14-15. 
105. Id. at 15. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., Treaties in Force, United States Department of State Publication 9285, 
Jan. l, 1982, p. 32-33. See also, FRANKLIN D. HOLZMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNDER 
COMMUNISUM - POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, 129-32 (1976). 
109. The contrast being isolated here is that the delicate balance in trade relations be-
tween the United States and the PRC is best met through negotiation at the Executive 
level. Trade remedies, such as the CVD, however, can be initiated by Congress or the domestic 
industry. They are problematic because they contain no discretionary mechanism by which 
their political spillover into other trade areas can be factored into a proper solution. While 
a final recommendation may hinge on Presidential enforcement, the process of reaching and 
altering those recommendations is arguably too inflexible for the delicate balance accom-
panying trade relations with the Communist countries. 
110. Statement by Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
Nov. 30, 1983, DOC DKT No. C570-005, at 2. 
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the perspective of Sino-American trade relations, the application 
of U.S. CVD law to NME countries doubly handicaps U.S. trade 
and political relations with much of the communist world. First, 
because of clear economic and social differences between market 
and non-market economies, a U.S. CVD investigation signifies not 
only a judgment of how the Chinese economy should be run, but 
it is a direct attempt to ascribe capitalist values to the socialist 
ideology. This, even more than the significance of adding a duty 
to Chinese goods, is a direct assertion of U.S. superiority, an asser-
tion inimical to Chinese ideology. A U.S. CVD investigation, 
therefore, represents a public attack on the Chinese ideology. 
Second, because of the linkages in Chinese trade policy, such as 
that currently between agricultural trade and textile trade issues, 111 
a President needs unencumbered discretion to negotiate solutions 
and either accept or reject the views of domestic industry.112 As 
long as an industry knows it can disrupt relations through the in-
itiation of a CVD investigation, such industries threaten any stable 
negotiated balance.113 Therefore, setting a precedent that industry 
initiated U.S. CVD procedures apply to NME countries severely 
escalates the level of difficulty in achieving lasting trade policy 
objectives with NME countries.114 
A major obstacle in this debate, as in most debates over 
statutory construction and legislative history, is that the world has 
changed so dramatically since the laws were written. When counter-
vailing duties were first implemented in the Tariff Act of 1897, 115 
who would have considered trade from non-market economies to 
be a threat to domestic producers? Even if Congress had, given 
the ethnocentric obsession of "American" lawmaking, it is hard to 
111. Evidence of this linkage within PRC trade policy can be gleaned from Chinese 
refusals to purchase American soybeans, man-made fibers, cotton and wheat when the United 
States restricted textile imports earlier in 1983 and then delayed in arriving at a new tex-
tile agreement to replace that which expired in January 1983. 8 U.S. Import Weekly [BNA] 
No. 18, at 678 (Aug. 3, 1983). 
112. Reference here is made to use of the President's power to engage in foreign trade 
agreements under the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1980). 
113. Some industry officials, such as Peter Handal, Chairman of the American Associa-
tion of Exporters and Importers' Textile and Apparel Group, would argue such is the cur-
rent position of the U.S. textile producers. See 9 U.S. Import Weekly [BNA] No. 11, at 428 
(Dec. 14, 1983). 
114. The difficulty here is heightened by the fact that Communist countries ascribe 
to the President the power to directly influence the outcome of CVD investigations- a power 
the President does not possess. 
115. What is now 19 U.S.C. § 1303, was originally enacted in 1897 as a part of the Tariff 
Act of that year. 
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argue that U.S. laws are based on any assumptions except those 
to which we ascribe and upon which our own system, economic and 
social, is based. Therefore, in determining the congressionally in-
tended scope of U.S. CVD law, in the absence of explicit history, 
presumption would favor only those applications to economic 
systems with distinct parallels to our own. An application of U.S. 
CVD law to NMEs, therefore, is arguably a clear misapplication 
of the basic assumptions of countervailability .116 
V. CONCLUSION 
Having isolated the various areas of contention presented by 
this debate, the last point to be made is that the need for concern 
is indeed real. While both sides present strong and clearly 
articulated arguments, the importers theoretical assertions are of 
little political weight when compared to the concrete evidence which 
shows that textile imports from the PRC have surged in past 
months.117 While there is no doubt that a full investigation may ab-
solve the Chinese dual system of its alleged countervailability, for 
the present, no legal theory is going to stop the political tide that 
has arisen against textile imports.118 As is often the case with novel 
applications of the law, the rationality of a legal determination is 
worthless when partisanship and special interests have yet to be 
heard. 
David James Cichanowicz 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. See also HOLZMAN, supra note 108, at 
38-40. 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
118. See especially statements by Senators Moynihan (Nov. 4, 1983) and Thurmond (Nov. 
3, 1983) and Governor King of North Carolina (Nov. 4, 1983), DOC DKT No. C570-005. 
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